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CASENOTES
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT BEANS PERFORMER
PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN BASEBALL'S TELECAST
RIGHTS RHUBARB
When the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Balti-
more Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association ("Balti-
more Orioles")'T in March 1987, it culminated decades of dispute between
the owners of the Major League Clubs ("Owners") and the Major
League Baseball Players Association ("Players") over who owns the tele-
vision rights to the Players' individual performances in major league
baseball games.2 But in refusing to review the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Baltimore Orioles, that the Owners own all rights to the Players' per-
formances in televised major league baseball games, the Supreme Court
has left the entertainment industry with significant questions as to what
extent rights of publicity created by state law may now be preempted by
federal copyright law.3
The Owners first sold network television rights to major league base-
ball games in 1947.4 In the years that followed, professional baseball's
television income increased steadily and that income represented an ever-
increasing percentage of baseball's total revenues.5 Yet, despite decades
of negotiation between the Owners and the Players, no consensus was
reached on precisely what rights were owned by whom or on how base-
ball's television revenues should be divided.6
1. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107A S.Ct. 1593 (1987).
2. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 665. Of course, the question of ownership in such rights
also entailed the question of who would control the hundreds of millions of dollars in future
television revenues sure to be generated by big-league baseball in the next few decades.
3. The questions are not new. For instance, see Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just
Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673 (1981).
Unfortunately, as discussed in the text, neither the Seventh Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme
Court has provided satisfying answers to the questions.
4. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 671.
5. In 1947, the Mutual Broadcasting System paid $65,000 for the exclusive right to air
the World Series that year. World Series Televised, Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 1947, at 65. In 1958, the
12 major league clubs that televised all or part of their schedule received $5,250,000 for the
right to televise their games. A. DANZIG & J. REICHLER, BASEBALL 130 (1959). In 1983, the
owners negotiated a contract that would bring them $1.1 billion from television rights over the
next six years. Baseball's Big League Blues, Bus. WK., Aug. 12, 1985, at 48.
6. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 665.
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In late May 1982, the Players sent letters to the Owners, and to the
television and cable companies with whom the Owners had contracted.7
The Players asserted that the television rights granted to the television
companies by the Owners "had been granted without 'having first ob-
tained the authorization (written or otherwise) of the players performing
in the games.' ," The Owners, however, had no intention of relinquishing
any part of the television licensing they had controlled for thirty-five
years. In June 1982, the Owners filed an action9 in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaratory
judgment that they "own all property rights in Major League Baseball
contests, including the exclusive right to license the telecasts of those
contests."'°
The Owners' suit contained four counts, each based on a different
theory, but each seeking essentially the same relief. Eventually, the
Owners abandoned the claims contained in Counts III and IV." Thus
the district court only ruled on the first two counts: Count I based on
copyright law, particularly the "works made for hire" doctrine of section
201(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("the Act"), and Count II based on
state master-servant law. 2 In May 1985, the district court granted sum-
7. Id.
8. Owners' Motion for Summary Judgment at 11-12.
9. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, Case No. 82 C 3710
(N.D. Ill. May 1985). Of the plaintiffs, the Baltimore Orioles are the first of the individual
American League Clubs listed in alphabetical order, followed by the individual National
League Clubs, the Major League Baseball Promotion Corporation, Baseball Commissioner
Bowie K. Kuhn, and The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs. Brief of Appellees,
Certificate of Interest.
10. Owners' Motion for Summary Judgment at 46.
II. Count III was based on the collective bargaining agreement between the Clubs and the
Players, including the Uniform Player's Contract. Count IV was based on the customs and
dealings of the parties. Further, on July 1, 1982 three major league players (pitcher Steve
Rogers of the Expos, pitcher Steve Renko of the Angels, and catcher Bob Boone of the Angels)
filed a suit, Rogers v. Kuhn, No. 82 C 6377, against the Owners in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The three players sought a declaration that the telecasts
of the games misappropriated their property rights in their names, pictures, and performances.
In asking for damages and injunctive relief, the three players put forward claims based on
alleged property rights in their names, pictures, and performances, on the doctrine of unjust
enrichment, and on New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51, which deal with privacy and public-
ity. The Rogers suit was later consolidated with the Baltimore Orioles suit, but, like Counts III
and IV of the latter, was abandoned before the district court decision. Baltimore Orioles, 805
F.2d at 667.
12. The subtle difference between Counts I and II was explained by the Seventh Circuit as
follows:
The Clubs' [The Owners'] copyright and master-servant claims are distinct. With
respect to the first claim, the Clubs contend that their copyright in the simultane-
ously recorded telecasts of major league baseball games preempts the Players' rights
of publicity in their performances. This claim, however, is limited to games that are
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mary judgment to the Owners on those two counts. The Players filed an
appeal with the Seventh Circuit. That court, in turn, affirmed the trial
court ruling as to the copyright claim, but vacated and remanded to the
trial court as to the state master-servant claim.' 3 On remand, the trial
court dismissed Count I.14 The decision in Baltimore Orioles therefore
speaks only to copyright law.
In affirming the district court's summary judgment, the Seventh Cir-
cuit agreed with the lower court's two central conclusions on the copy-
right claim: (1) that the Owners, alone, owned the copyright in the
baseball telecasts as works made for hire, and (2) that the Owners' copy-
right in those telecasts preempted whatever right of publicity the Players
had in their game-time performances.
15
THE COURT'S REASONING ON "WORKS MADE FOR HIRE"
On the issue of whether the Owners owned a copyright in the tele-
casts, Senior Circuit Judge Eschbach's analysis began with a statement of
the relevant sections of the Act: "[Copyright] vests initially in the author
or authors of the work."' 6 However, "[i]n the case of a work made for
hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author ... and, unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright." 7 "A work made for hire," as pertinent to
the Owners' suit, is defined by the Act as "a work prepared by an em-
fixed in tangible form. With respect to the second claim, the Clubs assert that, as
employers, they own the right to broadcast the Players' performances, regardless of
whether the game is reduced to tangible form. This claim extends to games that are
not broadcast or that are televised without being videotaped.
Id. at 679 n.30.
13. The Seventh Circuit pointed out how the district court in ruling on Count II relied on
"traditional principles of master-servant common law." But, "[n]otwithstanding the parties'
assumption to the contrary, master-servant law exists only with reference to the laws of partic-
ular states." Id. at 680. The court stated that the conflicts law of Illinois, the forum state,
governed the choice of law in this case. The parties were of such varied citizenship, however,
the court was unable to ascertain on the record before it which state's law governed on Count
II. Id. at 681. The district court's Count II judgment was vacated and the conflicts of law
matter was remanded. However, in doing so the Seventh Circuit made clear that the Owners'
master-servant claim was pendant to the copyright claim, that pendant jurisdiction is a doc-
trine of discretion, and that normally "when the federal claims are disposed of before trial, the
state claims should be dismissed without prejudice as a matter of course." Id. at 682.
14. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, Nos. 82 C 3710, 82 C
6377, slip op. (N.D. Il. June 17, 1987).
15. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 667.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
17. Id. § 201(b).
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ployee within the scope of his or her employment."18 Therefore:
[A]n employer owns a copyright in a work if (1) the work satis-
fies the generally applicable requirements for copyrightability
set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a),1191 (2) the work is prepared by
an employee, (3) the work was prepared within the scope of the
employee's employment, and (4) the parties have not expressly
agreed otherwise in a signed, written instrument.2 °
As to the first ownership requirement, the Seventh Circuit, agreeing
with the district court's opinion, held that the baseball telecasts met the
three conditions for copyrightability found in section 102 of the Act:
(1) fixation in tangible form, (2) originality of authorship, and (3) subject
matter of copyright. The court noted first that, "[s]ince the telecasts of
the games are videotaped at the same time that they are broadcast, the
telecasts are fixed in tangible form.",21 Second, the telecasts were "origi-
nal works of authorship" - that is, they were the independent creation
of their authors and embodied a sufficient amount of intellectual labor.
22
And third, the telecasts as audiovisual works are clearly within the sub-
ject matter of copyright as set forth in section 102(a) of the Act.23
Regarding the second requirement for copyright ownership by an
employer, the court found, and it was not disputed by the Players, "that
the Players are employees of their respective Clubs."
24
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the lower court that the scope of
the Players' employment encompassed the performances of major league
baseball before both live and remote audiences.25 On appeal, the Players
argued that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
Players' scope of employment included performances for television audi-
18. Id. § 101.
19. Section 102(a) provides in pertinent part:
Copyright protection subsists.., in original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) liter-
ary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion picture and other au-
diovisual works; and (7) sound recordings. [Emphasis added.]
20. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 667.
21. Id. at 668.
Section 101 of the Copyright Act expressly provides, in pertinent part, that -[a] work
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission."
22. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668 n.6.
23. See category (6) of the Act quoted above in note 19.
24. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 669.
25. Id. at 670.
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ences. The Players, however, failed to raise that contention before the
district court and therefore failed to preserve the argument for appeal.
The Seventh Circuit stated, however, that even if the contention had been
preserved, the Players had not produced evidence to warrant reversing
the lower court's finding on that argument.26 The Owners, however, had
brought forward evidence that the Players are acutely aware that major
league baseball games are televised and that television revenues have an
important bearing on the level of their salaries.27
In arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact as to the
ownership of rights in their performances, the Players relied on provi-
sions found in the Uniform Player's Contract, 28 the Benefit Plan (setting
out the details of the Players' pension fund), and the Basic Agreement
(representing the collective bargaining agreement between the Owners
and Players). The court, however, was not persuaded by the Players'
arguments. Beginning with the premise that the Players' performances
in televised baseball games are "works for hire" within the meaning of
section 201(b), the court reasoned that there is a statutory presumption
that the Owners own "all of the rights encompassed in the telecasts of the
games."29 According to the court, that presumption could not be over-
come unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise in a signed, written
document.3 ° The court found no such express statement in the written
agreements put forward by the Players and so held that the statutory
presumption was not overcome.31
26. Id. But had the contention been seriously made, perhaps evidence would have been
presented.
27. Id. at 670 n. 10.
28. Beginning in 1947, the first year the Owners sold television rights to the networks, the
Uniform Player's Contract contained the following clause: "The Player agrees that his picture
may be taken for still photographs, motion pictures or television at such times as the Club may
designate and that all rights in such pictures shall belong to the Club and may be used by the
Club for publicity purposes in any manner it desires." Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 671.
As to what the Players were actually granting the Owners through that clause in 1947,
three points should be noted: (1) The legal term of art "right of publicity," as we now use it,
did not make its appearance until 1952. See infra note 77. (2) The Players viewed the term
"publicity purposes" in their Uniform Player's Contract as equivalent to "promotional pur-
poses," not "commercial purposes." Brief of Appellants at 44-45. (3) The parties' appellate
briefs indicate that they disagreed sharply over the history of their past contract negotiations
and the construction of certain key contract provisions. Of course, summary judgment by the
Seventh Circuit denied a full airing of these issues before the trier of fact.
29. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 670.
30. Id. at 671 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)) (emphasis added).
31. The § 201(b) requirement that such reservation of rights be express and written is
substantially different from prior law which allowed that "such an agreement could be either
oral or implied." 805 F.2d at 672 (citing I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[D] (1985 rev.)).
19881
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THE COURT'S REASONING ON COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
After holding that the baseball telecasts are "works made for hire,"
the court addressed the preemption issue. The court held that the Own-
ers' copyright in the telecasts preempted the Players' rights of publicity
in those game-time performances. The starting point of the court's rea-
soning was section 301 of the Act, which expressly preempts rights under
state law that are equivalent to any of the bundle of rights protected by
federal copyright. 32 For preemption of a right under section 301(a) two
requirements have to be met: (1) the work in which copyright is asserted
must be "fixed in tangible form and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified in § 102,''33 and (2) "the right must be equivalent
to any of the rights specified in § 106."34 The court was convinced that
the Owners' videotaped telecasts, and the games themselves, met both
requirements.
Applying section 102, the Players argued that the works in which
they claimed rights were their live or real-time performances, and that
those performances per se were not copyrightable because, of themselves,
they were not fixed in tangible form. Because their actual performances
were not copyrightable, the Players contended, they retained a right of
publicity in those performances that could not properly be preempted by
a copyright in the telecasts. 35 The court disagreed. While noting that
unrecorded performances per se are not fixed in tangible form and are
therefore not copyrightable as such, it held that videotaping an evanes-
cent performance fixed the performance in tangible form and "once a
performance is reduced to tangible form, there is no distinction between
the performance and the recording of the performance for the purpose of
preemption under § 301(a)." '36
The Players also argued that their performances were not copyright-
able because those performances did not typify the kinds of creative or
aesthetic labor which characterize the works of authorship listed in sec-
32. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[All legal and equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of author-
ship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether published or un-
published, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
33. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674. See supra note 19 regarding section 102(a) of the
Act which sets forth the subject matter of copyright.
34. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674.
35. Id. at 674-75.
36. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
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tion 102(a) of the Act. 7 The court, however, held that "[r]egardless of
the creativity of the Players' performances, the works in which they as-
sert rights are copyrightable... because of the creative contributions of
the individuals responsible for recording the Players' performances."3
Next, the court discussed the section 106 requirement for preemp-
tion. That section grants the copyright owner the exclusive rights to
reproduce (in original or derivative form), to distribute, to perform, and
to display the copyrighted work. The court was convinced that any
state-law right that is infringed by reproducing, distributing, performing,
or displaying a work copyrighted under the federal Act is equivalent to
copyright. Citing the section 101 definition of "to perform," the court
stated that the term "to broadcast" an audiovisual work is encompassed
within the definition of "to perform" an audiovisual work. Because the
Players asserted an infringement of their publicity rights when their per-
formances were broadcast without their authorization, the court deemed
the Players' publicity right claim equivalent to a copyright claim.
The court was not convinced by the Players' argument that copy-
right was intended to benefit public interests and that publicity right was
intended to benefit individual pecuniary interests. The court viewed the
purpose behind federal copyright protection as the encouragement of in-
dividual effort in the creation of works beneficial to the public, and the
purpose behind state publicity right as the encouragement of "perform-
ances that appeal to the public."39 The Seventh Circuit did not see a
difference in the two rights: "Because the right of publicity does not
differ in kind from copyright, the Players' rights of publicity in their per-
formances cannot escape preemption. '
BALTIMORE ORIOLES AS PRECEDENT
The Seventh Circuit's seventeen page opinion in Baltimore Orioles
appears at first reading to be meticulous in its attention to factual detail,
legal precedent, and legislative history. Furthermore, reading the opin-
ion with only the actual parties in mind, the decision does not seem un-
reasonable. First of all, although not spotlighted in the opinion, it is
clear that while the Players claimed an ongoing infringement of their
publicity rights, they waited a full thirty-five years after the inception of
37. See supra note 19.
38. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676.
39. Id. at 678 (emphasis added). The fact that the right of publicity includes much more
than just "'performances" is discussed in the text accompanying notes 80 and 81. Regarding
the purpose of copyright, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (1987 rev.).
40. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679.
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network baseball telecasting to assert their publicity claim in any court.4"
Second, as was emphasized repeatedly in the Owners' briefs, professional
major-league ballplayers receive very substantial remuneration for their
services,42 and the Players are aware that such high remuneration is, in
part, made possible by the revenues the Owners receive from television.43
And third, as the court pointed out, even after its decision, the Players
are still free to bargain with the Owners for a contractual declaration
that they own a joint or exclusive interest in the copyright of the
telecast. 44
The result in Baltimore Orioles may represent a fair adjudication for
its parties. But as precedent for other cases, what are the potential, or
even likely, consequences of the reasoning in Baltimore Orioles? In at-
tempting to answer that question, the following two hypotheticals are
presented.
Tanda v. DeFraud
Miss 45 Rhonda Tanda is a young actress. A recent graduate of the
American Academy of Dramatic Arts, she is still paying off her student
loan and feels she cannot afford an attorney's services. She does not have
an agent, and she is not yet a member of Actor's Equity, S.A.G., or
A.F.T.R.A.46 Nevertheless, Miss Tanda is both very attractive and tal-
ented. Not long ago, she came to the attention of producer Cecil B. De-
Fraud who immediately cast her in the lead of his new off- (very far off-)
Broadway production of the play Tehachapi. Miss Tanda's short, non-
Equity employment contract with DeFraud contained this clause: "The
performer agrees that her performances may be videotaped and that such
tape may be used for promotional purposes." There was no other clause
41. ". . . telecasting of Major League Baseball games, which has continued without inter-
ruption for some 40 years." Brief of Appellees at 7.
42. ". . . extraordinary levels of compensation .... Brief of Appellees at 7.
43. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 670 n.10.
44. Id. at 679. We may speculate that had the Seventh Circuit allowed Baltimore Orioles
to proceed to trial the Owners quite possibly could have won on a legal theory other than
federal copyright preemption - e.g., implied consent and/or waiver within the context of the
employer-employee relationship. A thorough development of such speculation is, however,
beyond the scope of this casenote.
45. Before embarking on her acting career, Miss Tanda preferred to be called Ms. Tanda.
Since her acting debut, however, she has bowed to the show business convention that allows
even oft-married Elizabeth Taylor to remain a perpetual "Miss."
46. S.A.G. is the Screen Actor's Guild, A.F.T.R.A. is the American Federation of Televi-
sion and Radio Artists, and Actor's Equity is the union representing stage actors. Like many
struggling actresses, even if she could meet the professional experience prerequisites for gain-
ing membership, Miss Tanda's limited income does not provide her with enough to pay these
unions' dues.
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in the contract mentioning videotaping or filming of the show.
Tehachapi was a modest success, and Miss Tanda was hopeful that
before long she could earn more than the thirty dollars per night De-
Fraud was paying her.47
One afternoon, DeFraud announced to the cast that their evening
performance would be videotaped by a camera crew he had hired and
that segments of the performance would be used for promotional pur-
poses. That evening the entire show was videotaped and the next day
clips were shown on the evening news. That media attention helped
draw bigger audiences for a while, but in a month the show closed and
Miss Tanda was out of work. Unknown to Miss Tanda and the rest of
the cast, DeFraud soon put the tape of Tehachapi into post-production.
At modest expense the tape was edited down to under ninety minutes
and music was dubbed in. DeFraud registered the "audiovisual work"
with the copyright office and within six months Tehachapi was being
aired on cable television across the United States and in foreign coun-
tries. Even though the critics panned Tehachapi, DeFraud made a profit
in the high six figures. Miss Tanda, however, was not given one penny
from the proceeds of the telecasts, and she filed a suit against DeFraud
for infringement of her rights of publicity. How will she fare in court?
As strange as it may seem to those familiar with current entertain-
ment industry practices,4" if Baltimore Orioles is the standard applied,
Miss Tanda will most probably lose. Applying the Seventh Circuit's rea-
soning, DeFraud's tape of Tehachapi is copyrightable: It is an audiovi-
47. Actually, Miss Tanda was quite thankful she could earn even a small amount for her
performances. Actor's Equity has a membership of 36,000 with 85% of that number currently
unemployed. S.A.G. lists 70,000 dues-paying members, with 90% of that figure earning under
$10,000 per year and 30% earning nothing. A.F.T.R.A. claims 65,000 members with 70%
earning under $2,000 per year. Christon, The Glut of Actors - Enough Already. Los Angeles
Times, Calendar, Nov. 15, 1987, at 4, col. 1-2. Needless to say, the thousands of beginning
actors unable to qualify for or afford union membership do not obtain the protection of public-
ity and other rights afforded through union policies.
48. "[C]ontractual arrangements which govern the televising of names, likenesses and per-
formances throughout the sports and entertainment industry . . . reveal a single common
thread - the requirement of an express written grant of television rights." Brief of Appellants
at 6 n.6.
Actor's Equity specifically prohibits the filming, taping, or broadcasting of any produc-
tion without its express permission. Application for such permission must be made at least
thirty days in advance, and the terms and conditions under which such permission will be
granted must be negotiated with Equity. The union permits shooting of productions for com-
mercials of under three minutes only if the actors involved have signed the applicable
A.F.T.R.A. or S.A.G. contracts. Filming or taping of productions for use on television news
programs must also conform to a number of Equity-prescribed conditions. 3 DONALD C.
FARBER, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING GUIDE,
§ 134.01[10] (1987).
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sual work, fixed in a tangible medium of expression, of independent
origin, and contains the requisite level of creativity. Miss Tanda was an
employee of DeFraud.49 Her acting in Tehachapi was within the scope of
her employment. She knew that her performance was being taped and
that it would be aired on television. There was nothing in her agreement
that expressly reserved to her any rights in the videotape of the show.
And, finally, applying the reasoning of Baltimore Orioles, DeFraud's fed-
eral copyright claim would preempt whatever state rights of publicity
Miss Tanda might claim in the Tehachapi tape because the publicity
right is "infringed" by distribution of a work copyrighted under the Act.
Slidon v. DeFraud
The Tanda lawsuit is not DeFraud's only legal annoyance. A few
days after Tehachapi aired, a news photo in the Hollywood Inquisitor
caught DeFraud's attention. It was a shot of rock star Sly Slidon exiting
the chic Olympic Bonded Club in Los Angeles. What really first caught
DeFraud's eye was the silhouette of Sly's curvaceous companion. But
then DeFraud noticed that in the center of the photo, very prominently
displayed, was the logo of Feelahh clothing on the hip of Sly's tight-fit
jeans. After a few moments' thought, DeFraud phoned the publisher of
the Inquisitor and within minutes bought all rights to the Slidon photo-
graph. DeFraud then contacted Feelahh's president and negotiated an
advertising deal in which Feelahh agreed to give DeFraud five percent of
all sales in return for a DeFraud ad campaign based on the Slidon photo.
The campaign was a tremendous success; Feelahh sales skyrocketed;
and within six months DeFraud pocketed two million dollars from the
venture. Rocker Slidon, however, did not receive one cent from De-
Fraud or Feelahh. In fact, Slidon was never even contacted regarding
use of the photo in the campaign.5" Slidon has now sued DeFraud for
infringement of his right of publicity.
How will Slidon fare in his action against DeFraud? If Baltimore
Orioles is the standard applied, Sly will very likely fare no better than
Tanda. There is no law prohibiting the photographing of a public figure
in a public place. Sly's photo was published in a copyrighted publication.
49. In addition to employer-employee work-for-hire relationships, works for hire can arise
in relationships where works are specially commissioned. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
50. DeFraud took evening classes at a respected southern California law school until De-
cember 1987. (The school's registrar refuses to comment whether DeFraud was asked to leave
because of grades or because of a regulations infraction.) Before leaving law school, however.
DeFraud came across the Baltimore Orioles decision at the county law library, and as a result
of reading that opinion, he felt there was no need to ask Slidon's permission for anything.
[Vol. 8
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DeFraud purchased all rights to the Inquisitor photo. And by applying
the broad federal copyright preemption reasoning of Baltimore Orioles,
DeFraud's copyright under federal law will preempt whatever right of
publicity Slidon might claim under state law.
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
As the above two hypotheticals illustrate, one does not have to apply
the Baltimore Orioles decision reductio ad absurdum to see its potential
for generating lopsided results in future cases. Neither hypothetical is
based on an outlandish fact pattern; both hypotheticals are the kinds of
situations that quite probably could occur at any time. Unfortunately, by
methodically applying the reasoning of Baltimore Orioles to each, we ar-
rive at results that seem fundamentally unfair and out of step with mod-
ern notions of rights in intellectual property."' In each hypothetical
DeFraud was able to appropriate for his ongoing use and profit "prop-
erty" that was not his - the identities (faces, names, and personalities)
of Miss Tanda and Mr. Slidon. In neither case, however, was he required
to pay for the ongoing use of that property. Obviously, he did pay Miss
Tanda for her performances at the theater, and he did pay the Hollywood
Inquisitor for the rights to the Slidon photograph. DeFraud, however,
did not pay either Tanda or Slidon for his continuing use of their faces,
names, and personalities. And he will not have to, if the reasoning of
Baltimore Orioles prevails.
There are at least two major flaws in the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Baltimore Orioles. They are found in the court's reasoning on two
critical issues: First, does a copyright in a visual or audiovisual work
encompass a right to the actual object or event portrayed in the work?
And second, does the law of copyright protect the equivalent of what is
protected by the law of publicity? 2
51. The right of publicity - or the right of an individual to control the commercial ex-
ploitation of his or her identity - is generally acknowledged to be only a recently developed
legal doctrine. See infra note 77. It is interesting, however, that in Burrow-Giles Lithography
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), in which the Supreme Court held for the first time that
photographs were copyrightable, the plaintiff photographer who was engaged in the business of
commercially exploiting his copyrighted photographs of Oscar Wilde, did so "under an agree-
ment with Oscar Wilde." Id. at 54.
52. There also appears to be a flaw in the Seventh Circuit's expansive view of federal copy-
right preemption (as distinct from its position of extending copyright protection to the under-
lying events of recorded works). The court interpreted § 301(a) of the Act to mean that any
state-created right would be preempted if that state right involved the copyright subject matter
of §§ 102-103 and if the assertion of that state-created right infringed upon one of the bundle
of rights enumerated in § 106. 805 F.2d at 674. Applying the court's construction of § 301(a)
rigidly would seem to lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff suing a publisher for libel or
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REALITY Is NOT COPYRIGHTABLE
As to the first issue, the Seventh Circuit has clearly departed from a
long-standing principle of copyright law enunciated at least as far back as
1903 in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. ("Bleistein").5 3 That
principle is that the objects, persons, or events depicted in a copyright-
able work are, of themselves, not copyrightable. Bleistein revolved
around the question of whether three picture-posters depicting circus
scenes satisfied the originality requirement54 for copyrightability even
though the posters depicted real people and real events. The Court held
that they did. In so holding, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, ar-
ticulated what has ever since been a fundamental rule of copyright law:
It is obvious also that the plaintiff's case is not affected by the
fact, if it be one, that the pictures represented actual groups -
visible things.... But even if they had been drawn from the
life, that fact would not deprive them of protection. The oppo-
site proposition would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or
Whistler was common property because others might try their
hand on the same face. Others are free to copy the original,
They are not free to copy the copy."
In other words, although the graphic depictions of the circus acts
were copyrightable, the actual circus acts were not. Others had as much
right as plaintiff Bleistein to create their own graphic depictions of those
circus acts.56
Another case in which the Supreme Court articulated virtually the
same principle was International News Service v. Associated Press ("Asso-
ciated Press").57 That case involved the piracy of news information first
gathered and reported by the plaintiff. While that case did not involve
copyrighted materials and was essentially decided on the state-law doc-
trine of misappropriation,58 the Court discussed the closely related copy-
right law implications. The Court stated that "[i]n considering the
invasion of privacy would, upon victory, be unable to enjoin further distribution of the offend-
ing publication if it were copyrighted under the federal Act. For a lucid critique of such an
expansive view of federal copyright preemption, see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 11.14[B] (1987).
53. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
54. Originality is required in the sense that there must be an "author." U.S. CONST. ART.
I, § 8. See I NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 1.06[A].
55. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added).
56. Bleistein predated the development of the right of publicity by over four decades. See
note 77. Thus the emphasized words of Justice Holmes should not be extended beyond their
copyright subject matter.
57. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
58. Id. at 216.
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general question of property in news matter, it is necessary to recognize
its dual character, distinguishing between the substance of the informa-
tion and the particular form or collocation of words in which the writer
had communicated."59 Because news articles contain literary quality,
they are properly copyrightable. The Court wrote, however, that it was
not the intent of the Constitution's framers that the copyright clause
should extend to the author of a news article the exclusive right to report
on that news event.6°
While the Bleistein excerpt deals with graphic depictions and the
Associated Press excerpt deals with written depictions, taken together
they both reflect what has been a well-established principle of copyright
law: Copyright adheres in the writing (or drawing, painting, photograph,
film, etc.) created by the author; it does not adhere in the object, event, or
person written about or depicted. 6' Reality itself is not copyrightable.
Among the authorities relied on by the Seventh Circuit in Baltimore
Orioles was Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates ("Bernard Geis 9)62
which held that the Zapruder film of the John F. Kennedy assassination
possessed a sufficient degree of creativity for copyrightability. 63  Ironi-
cally, while Bernard Geis does indeed hold that films of actual events are
copyrightable, in the three pages of that opinion immediately preceding
the portion cited by the Seventh Circuit,' 4 the court in Bernard Geis
quoted with approval those portions of Bleistein and Associated Press
which state that the underlying persons and events depicted in copyright-
able works are themselves not copyrightable. For some reason, the Sev-
enth Circuit ignored those sections of Bernard Geis and extended
copyright protection to the actual baseball games depicted in the prop-
erly copyrightable tapes of those games.65
If we were to apply the copyright-extension reasoning 66 of Baltimore
Orioles retroactively to the facts of Bleistein and Bernard Geis, we would
get curious results. A circus act once depicted graphically in a copy-
59. Id. at 234.
60. Id.
61. Bleistein and Associated Press help to clarify the actual language of the Constitution's
patent and copyright clause: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries;" U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
62. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
63. Id. at 143 (cited in Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 668).
64. 293 F. Supp. 130 at 141-43.
65. The district court's holding that a baseball game is itself copyrightable, later affirmed
by the Seventh Circuit in Baltimore Orioles, is criticized by David Nimmer on just these
grounds in I NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 1.08[C][2] n.39.
66. See text accompanying note 36.
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righted illustration could no longer, without license, -be depicted graphi-
cally by others without infringing the copyright in the first illustration.
And, unless the fair use doctrine was invoked, no depiction of the John
F. Kennedy assassination could be made by anyone without a license
from Time Inc., the owner of the copyrighted Zapruder film. Such hold-
ings would run counter to the primary purpose of copyright protection,
which is not to benefit the author but "to secure 'the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.' "67 If copyright pro-
tection were actually extended in such ways the creative contributions of
authors, which Congress intended to encourage as a benefit to the public,
would not be encouraged, but would be stifled.
The Seventh Circuit was in error when it concluded that a baseball
game is itself fixed in tangible form when it is videotaped.6" What is fixed
in tangible form in such situations is not the game itself, but the game's
depiction as created by the television crew's director, associate director,
technical director, cameramen, editors, technicians, announcers, and au-
dio personnel.69 No matter how accurately it seems to capture the reality
of the event, a videotaped telecast of a sports event is never the equivalent
of the event itself.
While a videotape of a sports event is properly copyrightable,7° the
actual contest is not. Like human existence itself,"' a live sports event is
evanescent. It is itself not fixed in tangible form,7 2 is not a writing,73 and
is therefore not copyrightable.
YOUR IDENTITY IS NOT A WRITING
The Seventh Circuit held that the Players' rights of publicity in their
game-time performances74 were preempted "[b]ecause the right of pub-
licity does not differ in kind from copyright. . .. ."" In so equating the
two rights, the Seventh Circuit both misconstrued the nature of the right
of publicity and, to some extent, the nature of federal copyright.
67. 1 NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 1.03[A] (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,
127 (1932); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
68. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675.
69. For a detailed overview of the art and craft of television production, see HERBERT
ZETrL, TELEVISION PRODUCTION HANDBOOK (1984).
70. The Players never disputed this point.
71. "It is even a vapour, that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away." James
4:14 (King James).
72. 1 NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 1.08[C][2].
73. Id. at § 1.08[C].
74. The Players' rights of publicity in non-game-time endeavors was not an issue in the
case.
75. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 679.
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The right of publicity has been defined by one legal scholar as "the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his
or her identity."76 As a legal entity, the right of publicity is relatively
youthful in its evolving common law development.77 It is also an area of
law that has relied greatly for analogy and precedent upon privacy,
trademark, copyright, and misappropriation law.7" Nevertheless, the
right of publicity is a separate legal entity that has since the 1970's (if not
earlier) been repeatedly recognized by many courts as distinctly different
from its aforementioned relatives.79
One important difference between federal copyright and the state-
law right of publicity is that a publicity right may adhere in an individ-
ual's name ° or likeness, 81 whereas federal copyright may not adhere in
either.8 2 In Baltimore Orioles the Players claimed that there had been an
infringement of their rights of publicity in their names and likenesses, as
well as in their live performances.8 3
Another important difference between federal copyright and the
state-law right of publicity is that while the Act specifically requires "fix-
ation in a tangible medium of expression," 84 a state is not prohibited
from recognizing a right of publicity (or common law copyright, for that
matter)85 in a performance that is not fixed in tangible form.
In the famous "human cannonball" case, Zacchini v. Scripps How-
ard Broadcasting Co. ("Zacchini "),86 a television station videotaped a
circus performer's live (and therefore "unfixed") fifteen-second act and
broadcast it on a news program without the performer's permission. The
performer sued the station for lost revenues resulting from the station's
76. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, vii. (1987).
77. Professor McCarthy, while acknowledging that the right of publicity has its historical
antecedants in the related law of privacy, traces the origin of the right of publicity, as he has
defined it, to Judge Jerome Frank's coining of the term in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953). Accord-
ing to Professor McCarthy, it was Professor Melville B. Nimmer who then first studied the
new property right and defined it in his article The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203 (1954). Id. at § 1.7.
78. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.11 (1987).
79. Id. at § 1.10.
80. Id. at § 11.13[C][1].
81. Id. at § 11.13[C][2].
82. Neither a person's name or likeness constitutes a "work of authorship." I NIMMER,
supra note 39, at § 1.01[B][l] n.49.
83. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 680.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
85. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 980 (West 1982 & 1986 Supp.) cited in Baltimore Orioles,
805 F.2d at 675.
86. 433 U.S. 564 (1977).
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appropriation of his "professional property.""7 The case came before the
United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether the First Amend-
ment's free speech and free press protections immunized the station from
having to compensate Zacchini. The Court held that it did not. In so
holding, the Court recognized the right of publicity as a legal entity a
state could legitimately protect."8 Seeing the underlying purpose of the
right of publicity as "closely analogous to"8 9 the underlying purpose of
patent and copyright law, the Court, nevertheless, did not see any pre-
emption issue in the case, but instead wrote: "The Constitution no more
prevents a State from requiring [the station] to compensate [Zacchini] for
broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege [the station] to
film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner."9
Just as the publication or broadcast of a copyrighted work may be-
come the means by which a libel or invasion of privacy is effected, the
publication or broadcast of a copyrighted work may also become the
means by which someone's right of publicity is infringed. The fact that
the Seventh Circuit ignored the distinction between copyright and pub-
licity right seems to indicate that the court may have misconstrued the
copyright term "exclusive right" as being the equivalent of "right to
use." Professor McCarthy points out how that is a common misconcep-
tion and that properly "[a]n exclusive right is a right to exclude others.
Copyright is not a federally guaranteed 'right' to use the copyrighted
material."'" Therefore, in Professor McCarthy's view, "something like a
photo or motion picture may embody two separate 'property' rights, per-
haps owned by two separate persons. Copyright may be owned by A and
the Right of Publicity by B." 92
87. Id. at 565.
88. Id. at 574. Zacchini was the first and only case in which the state-law right of publicity
was recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Ironically, some legal scholars, who view
the right of publicity as essentially a proprietary interest in one's identity, see the facts of
Zacchini as more properly coming under the state law doctrine of misappropriation or under
common law copyright. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRI-
VACY, § 8.13 (1987). If such a view is accepted, it would suggest (with the superior vision of
hindsight) that the Players would have fared better had they emphasized rights in their identi-
ties rather than rights in their performances.
89. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. Nowhere, however, did the Court refer to the right of
publicity as being the same as, or identical to, copyright.
90. Id. at 576.
91. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11.14[C]
(1987).
92. Id. For a detailed explanation of how the concept of two rights in one property could
have been applied had the Players won in Baltimore Orioles, see James W. Quinn and Irwin H.
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CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit erred in extending the copyright protection ad-
hering in a videotaped telecast of a ballgame to the depicted sports event
itself. The court erred again in holding that the state-created right of
publicity is equivalent to federal copyright. Based on these two errone-
ous premises, the Seventh Circuit then inappropriately applied section
301(a) of the Act and, through federal copyright preemption, did away
with the Players' rights of publicity in their game-time performances.
In so deciding, the Seventh Circuit essentially held that where a per-
former is employed in the creation of a copyrightable work, any rights of
publicity the performer assumes to hold in his or her performance may
be extinguished by the copyright holder unless the performer has ex-
pressly reserved those rights in a written agreement with the employer.
The Seventh Circuit's view on retention of publicity rights in a perform-
ance is exactly opposite to the prevailing custom of the entertainment
industry, where it is generally the view that rights of publicity in a per-
formance are retained by the performer unless expressly assigned
through a grant of rights clause. In the Seventh Circuit's view such pub-
licity rights are not held by the performer unless they are expressly re-
tained through a reservation of rights clause.
It is, of course, impossible to predict to what jurisdictions or cases
the reasoning of Baltimore Orioles will be extended. Hopefully, Balti-
more Orioles will eventually be overruled, or confined to its facts. In the
meantime, entertainment industry contract negotiators should be aware
of the implications of Baltimore Orioles and of the importance of ex-
pressly clarifying publicity right ownership when drafting the employ-
ment contracts of performers.
John Trechak
Warren [two of the attorneys who represented the Players], Professional Team Sports New
Legal Arena: Television and the Players' Right of Publicity, 16 IND. L. REv. 487 (1983).
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